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This paper outlines the urgent measures that were
under taken from October 2001 onwards by the
European Union (EU) following the terrorist attacks
in the United States of America (USA). It refers to
the EU program of medium and long-term action on
chemical, biological and radio-nuclear threats that
covers all areas of policy of the EU, including health,
agriculture, food safety, internal affairs, financial
affairs, civil and environmental protection, trans-
port, energy and research, and analyses in detail the
specific program on health security which has been
implemented since December 2001 and its results
so far.
The health security program constitutes a key
component of the EU action on terrorism. It is now
being embedded in a wider effort of emergency
preparedness and response that became necessary
as a result of the lessons learnt from the SARS
epidemic. This effort also includes a fundamental
review of the agencies and services charged with
addressing emergencies and led to the proposal by
the European Commission to establish an EU Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control, which was
adopted by the European Parliament and by the
Council of Ministers of the European Union in April
2004.* Tel.: +352 4301 33465; fax: +352 4301 33449.
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The European Union is a union of twenty five Mem-
ber States — on 1st May 2004, ten countries, namely
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia
joined Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the Uni-
ted Kingdom (UK) to form a single space for more
than 450 million inhabitants, in which people,
goods, capital and services can circulate freely. Four
more countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania
and Turkey, are candidates for accession.
The EU has firm legal underpinnings that deline-
ate the powers and responsibilities among its cen-
tral institutions and the Member States. Founding
treaties were laid first in the 1950s and revised
several times since in inter-governmental confer-
ences. The last opened in the second half of 2003 in
Rome and led to agreement on a European Consti-
tution which will have to be ratified by all Member
States of the EU in order to come into force.
The EU’s law-making entity is the Council of
Ministers of its Member States acting, in many areas
of policy, together with the European Parliament.
The European Commission is the executive branch of
the Union and is the sole EU institution that has the
power of presenting legislative proposals. Moreover,
the Commission can legislate on matters on which it
has received delegated authority by the Council and
the European Parliament. An independent judiciaryes. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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the Tribunal of First Instance, to adjudicate on
matters of violation of European Community law
and on interpretation of statutes following applica-
tions from national courts.Looking back
The bioterrorist attacks in the USA in the autumn of
2001 pushed public health emergency preparedness
and response to the top of the political agenda. It
has been established that a single source was
responsible for all the attacks and that the strains
of anthrax detected are indistinguishable. This,
together with the fact that the perpetrator(s) of
the attacks remain unidentified, is a cause of great
concern. As long as a proper evaluation is not made
public and those responsible for the releases are
captured or otherwise neutralised, the risk of recur-
ring deliberate releases of such provenance is con-
sidered in the EU to remain high.
The terrorist events took place in the USA but had
a worldwide impact. In Europe, civil protection,
security and armed forces were put on alert, and
public health systems had to manage numerous
items of mail containing powders suspected or
claimed to be contaminated with anthrax. Until
2003, no terrorist attacks took place in Europe,
apart from a contaminated letter found in the
USA Embassy in Vienna, Austria, suggesting contam-
ination within USA government postal facilities.
On 7 January 2003, following raids two days ear-
lier in premises in London, the UK authorities
announced that a small amount of material found
in those premises had tested positive for the pre-
sence of ricin, a toxic substance that can be fatal if
ingested, inhaled or injected. On 2 June 2003,
numerous letters contaminated with adamsite were
mailed to various persons and organisations in Bel-
gium and several persons were taken ill. On 20 July
2004, letters containing powder made up mainly of
adamsite were sent to various governmental offices
in Belgium and, again, several persons were taken
ill. All incidents were handled competently but,
nevertheless, served as a sharp reminder to security
and health authorities to intensify their efforts to
plan and be ready for further deliberate dissemina-
tion of biological and chemical agents.Response in the EU following anthrax
attacks in the USA
A program on preventive alert for possible emer-
gencies was put forward by the Commission on 28November 20011 that also studied the vulnerabilities
of the EU from scientific and technological advances
related to bioterrorism. This program was subse-
quently revised and greatly expanded by the Council
and the Commission in December 20022 to cover all
chemical, biological and radio-nuclear terrorism
with specific reference to the legal and financial
instruments in the EU policies for preventing, pre-
paring for, responding timely to and mitigating the
consequences of terrorist attacks and threats. The
fact that the program was so revised more than a
year after the anthrax attacks reflected the con-
tinuing preoccupation of EU governments with the
terrorist threat. Details of the aforementioned pro-
gram have been outlined in three reports issued by
the European Commission, the first in November
2001,1 the second in June 20023 and the third,
dealing in detail with health aspects, on 2 June
2003.4Health Sector response
In borderless Europe, pathogens can slip by and
spread more easily. Bioterrorism incidents can be
hugely disruptive and costly even if they do not kill
or maim or involve ‘‘unlimited catastrophy’’ agents,
such as smallpox. The Health Ministers of the EU had
recognised early the risks from communicable dis-
eases in a borderless Europe and had taken several
decisions concerning their surveillance and control
prior to 9/11. Following the anthrax attacks, they
realised that they had to reckon with a larger
challenge. They also had to face up to a spate of
hoaxes with packages and letters that were causing
fear and panic. At the Council meeting of 15 Novem-
ber 2001, they called for EU action on the following
points:(a) Development of a mechanism for consultation in
the event of a crisis linked to the bio-terrorist
risk and a capacity for the deployment of joint
investigative teams(b) Setting up a mechanism for information on
the capacities of European laboratories with
respect to the prevention of and fight against
bio-terrorism(c) Setting up a mechanism for information on the
availability of serums, vaccines and antibiotics,
including concerted strategies for developing
and using those resources(d) Setting up a European network of experts in
the Member States responsible for evaluating,
managing and communicating risks(e) Promotion of the development of vaccines,
medicines and treatments.
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At the same time, on the wider international scene,
the bioterrorist attacks were the subject of high-
level contacts and meetings. Of particular impor-
tance was the meeting in Ottawa on 7 November
2001 of Health Ministers from the G7 group of
countries with the participation of the Health
Minister of Mexico and Mr Byrne, Member of the
Commission responsible for Health and Consumer
Protection. The meeting agreed a concerted global
action to strengthen the public health response to
the threat of international biological, chemical and
radio-nuclear terrorism, the outlines of which are
given below.Co-ordination in the European Union
Because of its borderless space and unevenly dis-
tributed resources to fight bioterrorism, it is essen-
tial that the EU put appropriate arrangements in
place to ensure prompt notification and exchange of
information in case of threats and attacks, action at
source to stem the spread of disease and environ-
mental contamination, mutual assistance for diag-
nosis and management of cases, access to special
laboratory services and expertise for epidemiologi-
cal investigations, and compatible public health
responses. This, in turn, requires sharing of knowl-
edge and good practice, laboratory facilities, equip-
ment and products, and experts and interventional
personnel across the Member States of the EU, as
well as good co-ordination and interoperability of
preparedness and response plans.
The importance of joint action in the EU to
complement national measures led to the establish-
ment on 26 October 2001 of a Health Security
Committee, comprised of high-level representa-
tives of the Health Ministers, to serve as the main
platform for co-operation in countering deliberate
releases of biological and chemical agents to cause
harm, and to the setting up in 2002 of a Task Force
of national experts and Commission officials to
implement an action program to enhance health
security. The Health Security Committee agreed
on 17 December 2001 to a program5 of co-operation
on preparedness and response to biological and
chemical agent attacks (health security), code-
named BICHAT, comprising 25 actions grouped under
four objectives:(a) Set up a mechanism for information exchange,
consultation and co-ordination for the handling
of health —related issues related to attacks(b) Create an EU-wide capability for the timely
detection and identification of biological and
chemical agents that might be used in attacks
and for the rapid and reliable determination and
diagnosis of relevant cases(c) Create a medicines stock and health services
database and a stand-by facility for making
medicines and health care specialists available
in cases of suspected or unfolding attacks(d) Draw up rules and disseminate guidance on
facing up to attacks from the health point of
view and co-ordinating the EU response and
links with third countries and international
organisations.Mechanism of alert and information
exchange
This mechanism consists of the Health Security
Committee and a rapid alert system (RAS-BICHAT)
established to deliver alert notifications and infor-
mation necessary and appropriate for co-ordinated
responses to attacks and threats. The Health Secur-
ity Committee is charged with exchanging informa-
tion on health-related threats, sharing information
and experience on preparedness and response
plans and crisis management strategies, commu-
nicating rapidly in case of health-related crises,
advising on preparedness and response as well as on
co-ordination of emergency planning at EU level,
sharing and co-ordinating health-related crisis
responses by Member States and the Commission
and facilitating and supporting co-ordination and
co-operation efforts and initiatives undertaken at
EU level.Rapid Alert System
The dedicated rapid alert system RAS-BICHAT has
been in operation since June 2002. The system links
the members of the Health Security Committee and
also national contact points designated by its mem-
bers which provide round the clock coverage and
urgent recalls in an emergency. The system comple-
ments the early warning and response system of the
EU for the prevention and control of communicable
diseases established in 1998.6,7 RAS-BICHAT uses
agreed notification procedures and criteria for the
classification of events according to the type of
release and the severity of consequences, using
an incident scale proposed in the context of the
Ottawa Global Health Security initiative. It has been
used on numerous occasions and is tested continu-
ally. Effective links have been established between
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rapid alert systems, notably on food, animal and
plant safety and on emergencies involving radio-
activity. The system is also linked to Commission
systems that scan and summarise information made
available through news agencies, other news media
and specialised sources on the World WideWeb. This
capability is being extended to involve other sources
of information and link up with similar systems
operated nationally and internationally, the objec-
tive being to facilitate the creation of an integrated
‘‘scanning the horizon’’ information system where
data are analysed to rapidly detect, track and
assess threats so that advance warning could be
provided before official confirmation or news breaks
out.Detection and identification of
biological agents
Although any biological or chemical agent capable
of causing harm to health may in theory be used
for terrorist purposes, a number of considerations,
such as ease of production and dissemination,
would point to a greater likelihood of some being
used than others. It is thus crucial to develop
agreed and updateable lists of biological and
chemical agents that are considered more likely
candidates for attacks, together with their charac-
teristics, associated symptoms and diseases, and
indications that permit their timely detection and
identification.Lists in the area of Public Health
Biological agents in relation to bioterrorism have
already been prioritised on the basis of certain
criteria, such as infectiousness, virulence, persis-
tence in the environment, ease of manipulation and
dissemination, and existence of defences to coun-
ter their propagation and effects. The European
Union has classified biological agents for the pur-
pose of health and safety at work and introduced
since 1990 obligations in respect of the possession,
storage, handling and use of biological agents in
workplaces.8 The European Agency for the Evalua-
tion of Medicinal Products (EMEA) has referred in
the advice9 it has given concerning vaccines and
treatments to the list published by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention of the USA that is
now linked with the so-called ‘‘special agent’’ pro-
visions in the USA. The Commission has put, since
June 2003, under special surveillance Bacillus
anthracis (for anthrax), Franciscella tularensis(for tularemia), Coxiella burnetii (for Q fever),
and Variola major (for smallpox) by their addition
to the EU lists of special agents.10 Moreover, in
order to identify and prioritise the different actions
needed against biological agents that might be used
for deliberate releases in a single tool, a matrix has
been developed together with a decision-making
algorithm for use by the EU national authorities.
The matrix serves to identify, for each agent, the
actions that need to be accorded priority and,
inversely, the priority agents for each action or
counter-measure.Export control lists
The EU has a compulsory regime11 for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology which
contains lists of biological and chemical agents
for which strict provisions linked to international
non-proliferation regimes and export control
arrangements apply. The latter are agreed by inter-
national mechanisms, one of them being the so-
called Australia Group,12 an international informal
group of countries that base their activities on
the biological and chemical weapon conventions
regarding the minimisation of the risk of chemical
and biological weapons proliferation. The agree-
ments are linked to European Community law. New
agents were added to the list in June 2002 but
concerns over the adverse impact of controls on
public health activities, such as barriers for and
delays in the transport of agents, samples,
reagents and specimens for tests and comparisons,
persist among national public health agencies and
laboratories. It is feared that piling up controls
without exempting public health agencies from
their scope is defeating the purpose of reacting
rapidly to threats and stopping outbreaks at
source. Laboratories: inventory and co-operation
Capability for fast and accurate characterisa-
tion of biological agents is unevenly distributed in
the EU. There are seven laboratory facilities in
five Member States of the EU that are suitable for
the handling and confirmation in samples and
specimens of high-risk agents such as viral hemor-
rhagic fever or smallpox viruses (P4 laboratories).
A network has been formed between these
laboratories to provide quality-assured diagnostic
services to all Member States, identify viral
hemorrhagic fever and pox agents, establish an
on-call availability of 24 hours seven days a week,
communicate rapidly with national authorities
and the Commission, develop a structure for
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nise training and skill development.
The Commission is encouraging the conclusion
of memoranda of understanding or co-operation
agreements between the national laboratory sys-
tems of the Member States, such as that existing
among the Scandinavian countries; satisfactory
progress has already been noted in this area.
Collaboration of high safety level laboratories
is also being pursued in the context of the Ottawa
Global Health Security initiative. Clinical guidelines for case recognition and man-
agement
Clinical guidelines for the recognition and case
management of diseases related to the pathogens
that may be used in deliberate releases have been
developed on the basis of a consensus process and
peer review. Ten manuscripts have been prepa-
red and will be published, on anthrax, smallpox,
botulism, plague, tularemia, hemorrhagic fever
viruses, brucella, Q fever, encephalitis viruses,
glanders and melioidosis.Chemical agents
Prioritising work has been carried out by the com-
pilation of a series of lists of chemical agents to
arrive at groups of substances requiring the same
public health and medical approaches. This effort
was aided by the co-operation in the context of the
Ottawa Global Health Security initiative. It also
drew from data on dangerous chemicals collected
by the Joint Research Centre of the EU pursuant to
European Community law on the control of major
accident hazards involving dangerous substances
(the Seveso Directive13). The risk grading of sub-
stances in the agents takes into account the relevant
provisions of European Community law on health
and safety requirements at the workplace concern-
ing chemical agents.14
Work is focussing on the clinical and toxicological
aspects of chemical incidents, national inventories
of chemical experts who can be made available, the
inventory of special treatment facilities, clinical
review papers on syndromes, and treatment and
training issues. Close working relationships have
been developed with national and international
organisations active in these areas, including the
National Focus for Response to Chemical Incidents in
the UK, the International Programme on Chemical
Safety (IPCS) and the European Association of Poison
Control Centers and Clinical Toxicologists (EAPCCT).
Data from a survey of poison centres conducted by
the Commission have been used to compile aninventory of clinical and laboratory-related exper-
tise in the EU. Finally, a guidance document on
the use of antidotes and pharmaceuticals against
chemical agents has been requested and obtained
from the EMEA.15Emergency plans
Consultations at the EU level and internationally
showed that the process of adjusting and comple-
menting emergency plans or devising new ones is not
yet complete, with some Member States more
advanced than others. Planning is a key priority in
the EU and has gained in importance following the
SARS epidemic. Member States and other countries
are keen to share knowledge and experience and
compare assumptions, scenarios, criteria and prin-
ciples for introducing particular counter-measures
at appropriate phases. They want to have flexible
and accommodating plans based on carefully con-
sidered policy options. These would include the
WHO’s ‘‘search and containment’’ policy for out-
breaks of infectious diseases such as smallpox.
Different responses to an outbreak would have to
be considered, depending on whether it occurred
in one’s territory or abroad, as well as responses
to multiple outbreaks spread widely, switching
between responses, or the scaling up of existing
counter-measures. Making measures by the Member
States compatible and inter-operable is the key
objective. To this end, a compilation of national
emergency plans has been made and a general EU
plan is being prepared following the SARS experi-
ence, which will serve to share and co-ordinate
specific measures. An EU-wide exercise will be car-
ried out in 2005 to evaluate communications and
compatibility of national plans. Commission parti-
cipation in the Global Mercury exercise this year,
to evaluate smallpox plans and communications
involving the parties of the Ottawa Global Health
Security initiative, has provided valuable lessons for
the conduct of the EU exercise.Modelling
Member States and the Commission have also
embarked on an effort to develop models to make
predictions about the progress of disease under
different scenarios and variable quantitative and
qualitative information on movements of people,
social habits, and various geographical, weather and
transport and utility conditions. Work on modelling
has intensified and is expected to further inform the
emergency planning process.
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assistance
Knowledge about bioterror agents and correspond-
ing diseases and their clinical and epidemiological
management and associated laboratory analysis
is limited. Hence the need to identify relevant
experts in the EU and list them in a directory to
be shared by the authorities of the Member States.
An expert could be made available by one Member
State to another on request to the authorities of
the expert’s Member State. Experts are designated
by the Health Security Committee in accordance
with criteria on qualifications and experience that
have already been drawn up. Other appropriate
instruments such as codes of conduct, terms of
reference and procedures for the consultation of
the directory in strict respect of confidentiality are
being developed.
The directory will be managed through collabora-
tion between the Member States and the Commis-
sion. It will be co-ordinated with the inventory held
by the Commission’s civil protection mechanism and
the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Net-
work roster. Regular updates will be made to the
contact details of all experts, and new experts will
be identified and added at regular intervals.Availability and stockpiling
of medicines
Immediately after the bioterrorist attacks in the
USA, attention focussed on the availability of med-
icines in the EU and the capability of industry and
the agencies and laboratories of the ‘old’ fifteen
Member States to make good any shortcomings in
production and supply. A consultation with the phar-
maceutical industry was launched in November
2001. A joint Commission services-pharmaceutical
industry task force was established in December
2001 to address availability, production capability,
storage and distribution capacity and development
plans for vaccines and other medicines used for the
treatment or prevention of disease in the event of a
biological attack. In the same month, a specific
network was also created via the EU Pharmaceutical
Committee, comprising contact points in the afore-
mentioned Member States to look at stocks and
availability. At the request of the Commission, the
EMEA delivered guidance8 on the use of medicines
against potential pathogens and a report on second
generation smallpox vaccines, based on hearings
held with six major vaccine manufacturers, and also
gave guidance on the development of vaccinia virus-
based vaccines against smallpox.Antibiotics
Stockpiling of antibiotics has occurred at the
national level in many of the ‘old’ fifteen Member
States, but not in all. Some rely on requirements
placed on pharmacists, distributors or hospitals but
these do not necessarily cover those most suitable
for countering bioterrorist attacks. Analysis of the
antibiotics capacity of industry showed that there is
very likely to be sufficient supply to meet demand in
all foreseeable situations. However, it was acknowl-
edged that there might be problems of distribution
in an emergency and the aforementioned Member
States have since expended efforts to sort out the
relevant problems.Smallpox vaccine
An assessment of national smallpox stockpiles has
been carried out which showed that most of the
‘old’ Member States have or are acquiring stockpiles
of smallpox vaccines. First generation vaccines have
been in storage since the 1970s. One Member State
resumed production of first generation (calf lymph)
vaccines in January 2002. Others have ordered sec-
ond generation vaccines. Some are considering
diluting their stock of first generation vaccines to
provide a greater number of doses.
From the information received so far, the sizes
of the national stockpiles in relation to the national
population range from enough to provide a dose for
every citizen in the ‘old’ fifteen Member States to
enough for one citizen in thirty. A national stockpile
providing total coverage for the population does not
necessarily imply a mass vaccination policy — it may
reflect a political decision to provide reassurance
for the population and to be able to respond to an
anticipated public demand. In line with WHO guide-
lines, all Member States have indicated that they
have a targeted vaccination policy. A few Member
States have published the key features of their
smallpox emergency plans.A putative EU stockpile
Foreseeable advantages of a EU stockpile of small-
pox vaccines were considered to be equity for all EU
citizens, increased purchasing power and economies
of scale, reduced overall costs up front by having a
proportion of stockpile as bulk product and by re-
launching production as necessary in response to
an emergency, increased leverage to encourage
companies to develop new vaccines, industry pre-
ference for dealing with one central contact and
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reserve of vaccine.
However, the issue of sharing and distribution
from the stockpile in case of Member States requir-
ing vaccine simultaneously proved difficult. Consul-
tations on options for an EU stockpile or virtual
reserve or a strategic sharing of national stockpiles
showed that most Member States would not support
such options at present. They considered that an
EU-level stockpile would not provide added value
over the existing and planned national stockpiles,
which provide more re-assurance over the key issue
of supply in time of need.Dilution of existing stocks
Studies in the USA showed that under ideal condi-
tions of storage and dilution, up to 5 times dilution
would result in doses retaining adequate potency.
However, studies launched by the Commission cast
doubts on the feasibility of dilution in real condi-
tions.Second generation vaccines
Second generation vaccines are acknowledged to
have superior production and quality control meth-
odology compared with first generation ones but
there is uncertainty about their safety profiles as
there are no published clinical data as yet. The
efficacy of first generation vaccines (in combination
with isolation and quarantine) was established dur-
ing WHO’s smallpox eradication campaign, whereas
for ethical reasons it will be impossible in present
times to establish the efficacy of second or third
generation vaccines in clinical trials.Current situation and actions foreseen
There are no authorised vaccines in the EU against
pathogens such as smallpox or plague. The only
authorised anthrax vaccine is not widely available.
In addition there is an insufficient supply of vaccinia
immunoglobulin (VIG), used for the treatment of
serious adverse reactions to smallpox vaccine and
there is a need for other medicinal products which
are currently unavailable or in short supply, such as
an anti-botulinum immunoglobulin.
The need to respond in an emergency following a
bioterrorist attack could lead to demands for the
distribution of non-authorised medicines, which is
currently illegal, or to the prescription of off-label
or non-authorised medicines, which raises liabilityissues. Advantage has been taken of the opportunity
presented by the current review of the EU pharma-
ceutical legislation to introduce legal amendments
in order to remedy this anomaly. These amendments
are now being examined by the European Parliament
and the Council of Ministers of the EU.
For the immediate future, action is being direc-
ted towards establishing sufficient quantities of
vaccinia immunoglobulin (VIG), and to fostering
the creation of a platform for European collabora-
tion to develop and produce biological products
such as botulinum antitoxin, an improved vaccine
against anthrax and a safe (third generation) vac-
cine against smallpox. In addition, developments in
the production and availability of smallpox vaccines
will be reviewed at regular intervals.Research
The EU has a 12 million euro biosecurity research
budget which complements those of its Member
States. Its objectives and areas of action have been
determined by a high-level peer process. An Expert
Group advises the Commission on this issue. Key
priorities are rapid diagnostics, detection tools,
disease and risk assessment models, new vaccines
and novel therapeutics, surveillance methods and
periodic appraisal of vulnerabilities.16Building a multi-sector response
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear ter-
rorism has direct consequences not only for people,
but also for the environment, the food chain and for
property. Preventing terrorist acts and mitigating
their consequences requires a mobilisation of
people and resources in many sectors other than
health. The joint program adopted by the Council
and the Commission on 20 December 20022 reviewed
the legislative and other measures already in place
and spelled out future actions to improve the multi-
sector response that needs to be mounted against a
threat or attack in the EU. Of major importance to
health security are the measures and actions in
food, animal, plant and water safety.Food safety
The EU has a broad body of legislation, which covers
primary production of agricultural products and
industrial production of processed food. This legis-
lative body provides different means to respond to
situations in specific sectors. The measures that
S28 G. Gouvraswould be taken in response to a terrorist act in the
food sector are not fundamentally different from
those adopted by the EU in response to accidents in
the recent past. There is no need to establish new
systems, but rather to adjust the current mechan-
isms in order to improve their functioning taking into
account the threat of bioterrorism.
The aspect of the fight against bioterrorism that
needs developing is the organisation of upstream
information, investigation and information-gather-
ing within the territory of the EU and third countries
as well as an improved co-operation between autho-
rities and those working in the food chain and their
education. Emphasis should also be given to co-
operation between the food sector and other sec-
tors of society. In particular, the role of education in
guaranteeing safety throughout the food chain must
be underlined.Animal safety
Many EU regulations exist in the area of animal
safety. In response to animal health emergencies,
the Commission will adopt urgent safeguard mea-
sures to supplement existing regulations. The Com-
mission manages a bank of about 40 million doses of
various antigens of the food-and-mouth disease
virus for the rapid formulation of vaccines. There
is on-going reinforcement of banks of vaccines
against foot-and-mouth, classical swine fever, avian
influenza and bluetongue. Imports are subject to
strict controls at the EU borders.Plant safety
Structures specifically intended to prevent the
abuse of plant protection products, which sample,
analyse and inspect randomly and at regular inter-
vals, are already in place in the EU. Phytosanitary
laboratories exist in all Member States. Strict noti-
fication requirements are enforced and inspections
are carried out in third countries for plants intended
for planting and for specified plant products. A
system is also in place for temporary safeguard
measures in the case of an imminent danger of
introduction or spread of harmful organisms.Water safety
As regards water safety, EU laws on the quality of
drinking water17 and on the quality of surface
waters used for drinking water abstraction are being
reviewed to check whether they sufficiently coverthe requirements for constant monitoring of drink-
ing water and other appropriate monitoring and
early warning systems. Multi-barrier systems, the
use of appropriate markers at key points and the
introduction of and adherence to the HACCP system
by suppliers are being promoted in the context of
the program on health security to enhance safety
and confidence in early detection of infective agents
and toxicants.International co-operation Ottawa Global Health Security initiative
Following the meeting of the G7 group of
Health Ministers in Ottawa on 7 November 2001
with the participation of the Health Minister of
Mexico and European Commissioner David Byrne,
a network of high-level officials was designated
for the handling of crises at the international
level. A Global Health Security Action Group
was also formed to implement the concerted
global action plan agreed at Ottawa. The plan
foresees the sharing of information and experi-
ence on preparedness and response plans, colla-
boration of laboratories, development of risk
communication and management methods, pro-
motion of mutual assistance in means to counter
attacks and training for health staff. The Ministers
and the Commissioner meet regularly to take
stock of progress with the action plan and also
share experience with health security develop-
ments in their respective jurisdictions.
A communications and plan evaluation exercise
code-named ‘‘Global Mercury’’ was conducted in
2003 by the parties to the initiative and the
WHO.18 Under the action plan, an incident scale
for risk communication was promoted together
with algorithms and guidance for its use. A train-
ing course for smallpox trainers has taken place, a
network of laboratories was set up and a plan of
co-operation on chemical releases was approved.
The Global Health Security Action Group is orga-
nising a number of workshops to take forward
these actions. Co-operation with the WHO
In addition to the co-operation with the WHO in
the framework of the Ottawa Global Health
Security Action initiative, the Commission is co-
operating bilaterally with WHO on a number of
subjects related to countering effects of deliber-
ate release of biological and chemical agents.
Important meetings and consultations have been
organised by the WHO with direct Commission
involvement on key aspects of health sector
responses to biological and chemical terrorism.
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A number of meetings have been held between
officials from the EU and NATO. An exchange of
papers ensued on the respective frameworks,
published material and current inventories of
activities concerning CBRN incidents and this
serves as a basis for further exchange of informa-
tion and co-operation on deliberate releases. Of
particular value in this respect is NATO’s guidance
and protocols on environmental sampling and
assessment concerning such incidents and their
update.
Conclusions and perspectives
Since the bioterrorist attacks in the USA, a series of
measures have been taken by the Member States,
the EU and internationally to reinforce prepa redness
for and response to deliberate releases of biological
and chemical agents to cause harm. The extent
and degree of implementation of measures varies
between countries, as do their resources in exper-
tise, materials, equipment and facilities.
Of utmost importance in countering bioterrorism
is speedy detection of a release and immediate
transmission of alert and relevant information to
those charged with mounting the appropriate
response. Member States are improving their epi-
demiological surveillance apparatus and their bio-
logical and chemical monitoring capabilities and
have set up national systems of alert and informa-
tion transmission. At the EU level, the Rapid Alert
System for biological and chemical attacks and
threats was set up to allow prompt notification
and transmission of alerts and consultation between
the Member States and the Commission on counter-
measures. The system is expanding to capture and
interpret public health intelligence and provide
advance warning of outbreaks.
Adequate capacity in public health and health
services will be crucial in deciding on counter-mea-
sures or switching to different ones. Laboratory
capacity is not sufficient in many Member States.
The Member States and the Commission are working
together to remedy this. Collaboration with the
USA, Canada, Japan, Mexico and others on this will
be crucial. The EU is also working to assist national
health services for emergencies through the issu-
ance of guidelines, the dispatch of expertise and the
provision of scientific advice.
Shielding people against agents and mitigating
the effects of exposure to them requires recourse to
suitable medicines. The European Union’s pharma-
ceutical armamentarium against pathogens and
chemicals that can be used in attacks is not yetcomplete. Progress has to be made urgently on
acquiring vaccinia immunoglobulin, anti-toxins
and better and safer vaccines.
The implementation of the European Union’s
programme on health security helped to drive action
on bioterrorism forward. The program is implemen-
ted by national experts and Commission officials
that work together on health security with the
Health Security Committee. The future European
Union Centre for Disease Prevention and Control was
agreed following a proposal by the Commission in
July 200318 in the light of the experience acquired
following the SARS epidemic which brought home
the difficulty of coping with a disease with symp-
toms like many others and not as distinct (and
therefore more easy to identify) as smallpox. This
centre will be a key player in providing advice to the
Member States and the EU institutions, as well as in
implementing surveillance and response actions in
the area of health security.References
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